Shield sizing and response equations

A consolidated list is presented of meteoroid debris shield equations which have been given in the referenced memorandums. In some cases, equations have been updated; thus, this memorandum supersedes reference 1. The equations are presented in two parts: (1) shield sizing equations which are used to produce preliminary estimates of shielding weights; and (2) response equations to describe the impact conditions (projectile size as a function of velocity, density, and impact angle) causing failure of a given shield that are to be used for probability analyses (such as in the modified BUMPER program). Specific equations are given that are applicable for the following types of shields: aluminum Whipple shields; Nextel multishock (MS) shields; and mesh double bumper (MDB) shields. These equations will be updated in the future as warranted by the results of additional HVI tests, analyses, and shield modeling

Heat-Cleaned Nextel in MMOD Shielding

Meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shielding can include NextelTM ceramic cloth in the outer layers of the shielding to enhance MMOD breakup. The Nextel fabric can contain size (or sizing) which aids in manufacture of the fabric. Sizing is a starch, oil or waxy material that is added to the rovings and yarns to protect the fibers from being cut or broken during the fabric manufacturing process and by later handling. For spacecraft applications, sizing is removed by heat-cleaning to reduce/eliminate off-gassing during vacuum operations. After the sizing is removed, the fibers in the woven fabric are prone to breakage during handling which reduces fabric strength. Because heat-cleaned Nextel tends to shed fibers that can be irritating to workers, the usual practice for hypervelocity impact tests is to use Nextel with sizing. The reduced strength of heat-cleaned Nextel does not typically effect the performance of MMOD shields with Nextel used in outer layers of the shield, because the density and areal density of the ceramic fibers in the fabric control MMOD breakup (not fabric strength). This paper provides data demonstrating that hypervelocity impact protection performance is not adversely altered for shields containing heat-cleaned Nextel compared to Nextel with sizing

An Astronaut's Risk of Experiencing a Critical Impact from Lunar Ejecta During Lunar EVA

The Moon is under constant bombardment by meteoroids. When the meteoroid is large, the impact craters the surface, launching crater ejecta far from the impact potentially threatening astronauts on the lunar surface. In the early 1960s, the ejecta impact flux was thought no more than the sporadic meteoroid flux but with speeds one to two orders of magnitude smaller. However, the Lunar Module designers realized by 1965 that meteoroid bumpers do not perform well at the smaller ejecta impact speeds. Their estimates of the Lunar Module risk of penetration by ejecta were 25 to 50% of the total risk. This was in spite of the exposure time to ejecta being only a third of that to sporadic meteoroids. The standard committee based the 1969 NASA SP-8013 lunar ejecta environment on Zooks 1967 flux analysis and Gault, Shoemaker and Moores 1963 test data for impacts into solid basalt targets. However, Zook noted in his 1967 analysis, that if the lunar surface was composed of soil, that the ejected soil particles would be smaller than ejected basalt fragments and that the ejection speeds would be smaller. Both effects contribute to reducing the risk of a critical failure due to lunar ejecta. The authors revised Zooks analysis to incorporate soil particle size distributions developed from analysis of Apollo lunar soil samples and ejected mass as a function of ejecta speed developed from coupling parameter analyses of soil impact-test data. The authors estimated EVA risk by assuming failure occurs at a critical impact energy. At these impact speeds, this might be true for suit hard and soft goods. However, these speeds are small enough that there may be significant strength effects that require new test data to modify the hypervelocity critical energy failure criterion. With these caveats, Christiansen, Cour-Palais and Freisen list the critical energy of the ISS EMU hard upper torso as 44 J and the helmet and visor as 71 J at hypervelocity. The authors then assumed that the lunar EVA suit fails at 50 J critical energy. This results in a 1,700,000 years mean time to failure using the results of this analysis and a 3,800 years mean time to failure using NASA SP-8013

On protection of Freedom's solar dynamic radiator from the orbital debris environment. Part 2: Further testing and analyses

Presented here are results of a test program undertaken to further define the response of the solar dynamic radiator to hypervelocity impact (HVI). Tests were conducted on representative radiator panels (under ambient, nonoperating conditions) over a range of velocity. Target parameters are also varied. Data indicate that analytical penetration predictions are conservative (i.e., pessimistic) for the specific configuration of the solar dynamic radiator. Test results are used to define the solar dynamic radiator reliability with respect to HVI more rigorously than previous studies. Test data, reliability, and survivability results are presented

On protection of Freedom's solar dynamic radiator from the orbital debris environment. Part 1: Preliminary analyses and testing

A great deal of experimentation and analysis was performed to quantify penetration thresholds of components which will experience orbital debris impacts. Penetration was found to depend upon mission specific parameters such as orbital altitude, inclination, and orientation of the component; and upon component specific parameters such as material, density and the geometry particular to its shielding. Experimental results are highly dependent upon shield configuration and cannot be extrapolated with confidence to alternate shield configurations. Also, current experimental capabilities are limited to velocities which only approach the lower limit of predicted orbital debris velocities. Therefore, prediction of the penetrating particle size for a particular component having a complex geometry remains highly uncertain. An approach is described which was developed to assess on-orbit survivability of the solar dynamic radiator due to micrometeoroid and space debris impacts. Preliminary analyses are presented to quantify the solar dynamic radiator survivability, and include the type of particle and particle population expected to defeat the radiator bumpering (i.e., penetrate a fluid flow tube). Results of preliminary hypervelocity impact testing performed on radiator panel samples (in the 6 to 7 km/sec velocity range) are also presented. Plans for further analyses and testing are discussed. These efforts are expected to lead to a radiator design which will perform to requirements over the expected lifetime

Observations of MMOD Impact Damage to the ISS

This paper describes meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage observations on the International Space Station (ISS). Several hundred MMOD damage sites on ISS have been documented using imagery taken from ISS windows. MMOD damage sites visible from ISS windows are typically larger approximately 5mm diameter and greater due to the larger viewer-to-surface distance. Closer inspection of these surfaces by astronauts during spacewalks reveals many smaller features that are typically less distinct. Characterization of these features as MMOD or non- MMOD is difficult, but can be partially accomplished by matching physical characteristics of the damage against typical MMOD impact damage observed on ground-based impact tests. Numerous pieces of space-exposed ISS hardware were returned during space shuttle missions. Subsequent ground inspection of this hardware has also contributed to the database of ISS MMOD impact damage. A handful of orbital replacement units (ORUs) from the ISS active thermal control and electrical power subsystems were swapped out and returned during the Space Shuttle program. In addition, a reusable logistics module was deployed on ISS for a total 59.4 days on 11 shuttle missions between 2001 and 2011 and then brought back in the shuttle payload bay. All of this returned hardware was subjected to detailed post-flight inspections for MMOD damage, and a database with over 1,400 impact records has been collected. A description of the largest observed damage features is provided in the paper. In addition, a discussion of significant MMOD impact sites with operational or design aspects is presented. MMOD impact damage to the following ISS modules/subsystems is described: (1) Solar Arrays, (2) US and Russian windows, (3) Extravehicular Activity (EVA) handrails, (4) Radiators, and (5) Russian Functional Cargo Block (FGB) module

Flexible Multi-Shock Shield

Flexible multi-shock shield system and method are disclosed for defending against hypervelocity particles. The flexible multi-shock shield system and method may include a number of flexible bumpers or shield layers spaced apart by one or more resilient support layers, all of which may be encapsulated in a protective cover. Fasteners associated with the protective cover allow the flexible multi-shock shield to be secured to the surface of a structure to be protected

Comparison of Risk from Orbital Debris and Meteoroid Environment Models on the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure from an impact from a meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. An extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) spacesuit impact during a US extravehicular activity (EVA) is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. A risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) by the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA. Need to understand the effect of updated meteoroid and orbital debris environment models to EMU risk

Hypervelocity Impact of Explosive Transfer Lines

Hypervelocity impact tests of 2.5 grains per foot flexible confined detonating chord (FCDC) shielded by a 1 mm thick 2024-T3 aluminum alloy bumper standing off 51 mm from the FCDC were performed. Testing showed that a 6 mm diameter 2017-T4 aluminum alloy ball impacting the bumper at 6.97 km/s and 45 degrees impact angle initiated the FCDC. However, impact by the same diameter and speed ball at 0 degrees angle of impact did not initiate the FCDC. Furthermore, impact at 45 degrees and the same speed by a slightly smaller diameter ball (5.8 mm diameter) also did not initiate the FCDC

Hypervelocity Impact Evaluation of Metal Foam Core Sandwich Structures

A series of hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were conducted by the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF) [1], building 267 (Houston, Texas) between January 2003 and December 2005 to test the HVI performance of metal foams, as compared to the metal honeycomb panels currently in service. The HITF testing was conducted at the NASA JSC White Sands Testing Facility (WSTF) at Las Cruces, New Mexico. Eric L. Christiansen, Ph.D., and NASA Lead for Micro-Meteoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD) Protection requested these hypervelocity impact tests as part of shielding research conducted for the JSC Center Director Discretionary Fund (CDDF) project. The structure tested is a metal foam sandwich structure; a metal foam core between two metal facesheets. Aluminum and Titanium metals were tested for foam sandwich and honeycomb sandwich structures. Aluminum honeycomb core material is currently used in Orbiter Vehicle (OV) radiator panels and in other places in space structures. It has many desirable characteristics and performs well by many measures, especially when normalized by density. Aluminum honeycomb does not perform well in Hypervelocity Impact (HVI) Testing. This is a concern, as honeycomb panels are often exposed to space environments, and take on the role of Micrometeoroid / Orbital Debris (MMOD) shielding. Therefore, information on possible replacement core materials which perform adequately in all necessary functions of the material would be useful. In this report, HVI data is gathered for these two core materials in certain configurations and compared to gain understanding of the metal foam HVI performance